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18 January 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: NSAM 311 - KH-4, KH-6 and [REDACTED] Coverage of Cuba

Reference: Colonel Worthman's MFR, same subject, dtd 14 Jan 65

On 15 January 1965, I met with Dr. McMillan and Mr. Friedman of ASD/ISA to discuss the results of Dr. McMillan's meeting with Mr. Vance (earlier this week) concerning the idea of revitalizing the KH-6 system for use against Cuba.

Dr. McMillan's comments:

1. Mr. Vance not too enthusiastic - KH-6 ~~missile~~ stereo, would take a year to develop. Despite obvious advantages, KH-6 is not "instant joy" -- still much work required to establish operational capability.
2. Politically, some risk (embarrassment) might evolve if we make a positive statement that KH-6 could be made to do this job -- some of the embarrassment would certainly accrue to Secretary of Defense.
3. Cuban requirements are unrealistic -- Dr. McMillan said, Under Secretary of Defense wanted restatement.
4. Mr. Vance does not believe Cubans will "do anything." If missiles are re-introduced we would know this -- thru existing reconnaissance and/or agent reports.
5. Mr. Vance does not want to "do anything about KH-6 now." His idea: "Continue using KH-4 to locate gross activity of interest" -- use a [REDACTED] "specifically designated as a Cuban standby for closer looks."

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Mr. Friedman's observations:

6. We would be deficient in not calling to attention of the President capability of KH-6 for this job.

7. Concerning Mr. Vance's proposal -- this would start a [REDACTED] every time we considered a situation in Cuba of sufficient urgency to launch a "standby" [REDACTED] specifically against Cuba.

8. Consideration should be given to cost and availability factors in weighing "7-8 standby (suspicious) [REDACTED]" against X number of KH-6's.

Dr. McMillan:

9. Have you made this speech to Mr. Vance yet? Friedman indicated that he had not.

10. Advised that he already had a contractor looking at problems involved in giving KH-6 a stereo mode.

11. Said he knew CIA was not in favor of KH-6 -- or use of any other satellites over Cuba.

12. Asked if we had taken a look at coverage of individual targets in China with KH-6 launched at 24 and 34<sup>0</sup>, I advised we had taken a look only at broad coverage there -- not individual targets. He asked that we look at individual target coverage in China. ACTION ITEM.

Conclusions

13. Mr. Friedman said he thought that the Secretary of Defense should advise the President that "we are going ahead with maximizing existing KH-4/[REDACTED] programs against Cuba -- and are also working to revitalize the KH-6 program for this purpose."

14. Dr. McMillan said he had no objection to Friedman's trying to interest Mr. Vance, however, he wished to reiterate that this was not an instant solution and wished to impose some "safeguards" on any

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
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Vance/Friedman discussion on KH-6 -- he wanted to be sure that a program was defined and that Mr. Vance understood there was work to be done before an operational KH-6 capability could be realized.

15. After the meeting, Mr. Friedman asked that Colonel Worthman and I follow up on the item in par. 12 above and that we work up a paper showing definitively what, how much and how long is involved in re-establishing a KH-6 launch capability. He would like to see such a paper by next Tuesday -- 19 January 1965.

  
RICHARD S. QUIGGINS  
Lt Colonel, USAF

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